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This paper investigates price sensitivity of demand for prescription drugs using drug purchase 
records for at 20% random sample of the Danish population. We identify price responsiveness by 
exploiting exogenous variation in prices caused by kinked reimbursement schemes and implement a 
regression kink design. Thus, within a unifying framework we uncover price sensitivity for different 
subpopulations and types of drugs. The results suggest low average price responsiveness with 
corresponding price elasticities ranging from -0.08 to -0.25, implying that demand is inelastic. 
Individuals with lower education and income are, however, more responsive to the price. Also, 
essential drugs that prevent deterioration in health and prolong life have lower associated average 
price sensitivity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During 1998-2007, real pharmaceutical spending within the OECD went up almost 50%, reaching 
more than USD 650 billion in 2007. Furthermore, drug spending (prescription and non-prescription) 
amounted to an impressive 15% of total health spending with a US growth that was more than twice 
of that of total health expenditures; see OECD (2009). Spending on pharmaceuticals is foreseen to 
increase even further in the future, putting severe pressure on health care budgets. To control such 
spending, there is increased interest in designing optimal health insurance schemes. Necessary 
inputs into the construction of health insurance policies are reliable estimates of price sensitivity of 
demand yet the empirical evidence in this area is limited and the existing estimates vary 
considerably. Furthermore, different subgroups in the population do not invest the same in their 
own health and do not face the same budget constraints. To the extent that subgroups will also react 
differently to prices of prescription drugs, subgroup specific estimates are crucial.  
 
Clearly, the task of uncovering price sensitivity of demand for drugs is complicated by the standard 
selection problem: individuals who purchase prescription drugs do not constitute a random part of 
the population; presumably they have a higher willingness to pay than individuals who refrain from 
buying. Moreover, even if studies attempt to deal with this essential identification problem, they are 
often not able to distinguish spending on one type of prescription drug from other types or even 
from different types of health care usage such as hospital admittance. In other cases, the type of 
drug is known but the price is not. This is typically solved by a combination of substantial 
assumptions and an imputation strategy. Finally, identification strategies often restrict the results to 
hold only for a specific subgroup of the overall population. 
 
The perhaps most widely known study within this field is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(HIE), which ran from the late 1970’s to the start of the 1980’s. The unique feature of the HIE was 
that insurance plans for non-aged individuals (61 or below) were randomly assigned in 6 different 
locations across the US. The insurance plans differed in the size of the deductible amount, co-
insurance rates and full stop-loss; an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures. In this sense, the 
study had the flavor of a randomized experiment, which has led many to consider it the gold 
standard in the literature. The average price elasticity of overall health care demand including   3
prescription drugs, hospital utilization and other health care services was estimated to be -0.20 in 
the study, see Manning et al. (1987) and Newhouse (1993).  
 
While well executed and evaluated, an important limitation of the RAND HIE was that it did not 
consider the elderly population that accounts for a large share of medical expenditures. Recognizing 
this point, Contoyannis et al. (2005) estimate the price elasticity for prescription drugs in the 
presence of a nonlinear price schedule for the elderly people (age 65 or over) enrolled in the Quebec 
Public Pharmacare program in Canada exploiting time variation in cost-sharing. Their overall 
finding is a price elasticity ranging from -0.12 to -0.16. Similarly, Chandra et al. (forthcoming) 
study price responsiveness for people enrolled in California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) with focus on the elderly population. In 2001 co-payments went up for the fraction of 
enrollees under Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), and in 2002 co-payments were increased 
for the fraction that received care through HMO’s. Applying a difference-in-difference framework, 
the authors estimate drug utilization elasticities with respect to patient cost. Resulting elasticities 
range from -0.20 to -1.4. 
  
Acknowledging the fact that price elasticities for prescription drugs are likely to be just at 
heterogenous across types of drugs as price elasticities for other types of products, Goldman et al 
(2004) and Landsman et al. (2005) study price responsiveness for different types of therapeutic 
groups. Using regression type analyses on pharmacy claims data combined with cross-sectional 
variation in health plan benefits designs, both studies find that drugs used for chronic conditions are 
less price sensitive (-0.1 to -0.2) than drugs used for more acute conditions (-0.3 to -0.6). 
Furthermore, Tamblyn et al. (2001) considers both the elderly population and welfare participants 
in Quebec, Canada and find that demand for essential drugs reacts less to the introduction of 
prescription drug cost-sharing than demand for less essential drugs.  
 
In this paper we add to the scarce but growing literature and investigate the issue of whether 
demand for prescription drugs is sensitive to the price. We estimate the change in the propensity to 
consume caused by a change in the price. All estimates of price sensitivity are uncovered within a 
context where individuals may be forward looking and within a market where private health 
insurance – that may cover part of or all costs related to prescription drugs – exists. We believe that 
these are the policy relevant parameters if one is interested in changing the current system   4
marginally.
1 We use a rich register-based data set on a 20 % random sample of the Danish 
population in the period 2000-2003. Contrary to many existing data sets, ours includes information 
on therapeutic group, price, and out-of-pocket payment for every prescription drug purchase. These 
data are augmented with socio-economic characteristics on a yearly basis. Besides superior data, 
our main contributions are the following: 1) we use a regression kink design to overcome the 
standard selection problem. The idea is very close to that of a regression discontinuity design (see 
for example Lee and Lemieux (2009)) except that instead of a shift in levels, we exploit a shift in 
slopes.
2 Here we directly exploit that coinsurance payments decrease in a discontinuous fashion as 
consumption (on a yearly basis) increases. In principle, there is no reason to think that individuals 
just above a given kink point are different from individuals just below – except for the fact that the 
price faced by individuals below the kink point decrease less  with total consumption than for 
individuals above the kink point. Comparing the propensity to purchase for individuals who are just 
above and just below kink points then allows us to identify price sensitivities. While we are not the 
first to acknowledge the existence of this type of identification, see for example Guryan (2003) and 
Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (forthcoming), we are, to the best of our knowledge, among the very 
first to directly implement such a design. Recently, Card, Lee and Pei (2009) have established 
conditions under which the regression kink design nonparametrically identifies the “local average 
response” (Altonji and Matzkin (2005)) or, equivalently, the “treatment on the treated” (Florens, 
Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008)). Card, Lee and Pei (2009) also provide the only other direct 
implementation of a regression kink design that we are aware of. 2) Health insurance is universally 
supplied by the Danish government, allowing us to use a unifying identification strategy to consider 
estimates for the entire Danish population as well as estimates for subgroups defined by socio-
economic characteristics. Using the same identification strategy for all subgroups makes it much 
easier to compare estimates across subgroups. This is a major advantage compared to the existing 
studies that either only have access to (or exploit) a relatively young (RAND HIE) or old 
(Contoyannis et al. (2005), Chandra et al. (forthcoming)) population or do not distinguish between 
subpopulations. We demonstrate that estimates for relevant subgroups are of reasonable size and 
relate to each other in a meaningful way, which clearly increases the credibility of the overall 
                                                 
1 Of course, our estimates are uninformative about underlying price sensitivity in the absence of a private health 
insurance market. 
2 In particular the tax literature has devoted considerable attention to kinks (in budget sets); see Moffitt (1990) for an 
early overview. Recently, these kinks have also been used as the basis for identification, for example to investigate the 
responsiveness of labor supply to tax schemes; see Saez (2009) and Chetty et al. (2009). In fact, various non-linear 
pricing schedules are often exploited to generate instruments in the economics literature; for recent examples see 
Rothstein and Rouse (2007), Nielsen, Sørensen and Taber (2008), and Dynarski, Gruber and Li (2009).   5
identification strategy. 3) Finally, in addition to providing subpopulation specific estimates, we also 
distinguish between types of drugs, something which is rarely possible simply because of lack of 
data. 
 
Our results suggest that demand is inelastic; we find low average price responsiveness with a 
corresponding price elasticity ranging from -0.08 to -0.25, thus comparable to the results from the 
RAND HIE for the overall population. Individuals with lower education and income are, however, 
more responsive to the price. The same is true for the elderly population, though our estimates are 
somewhat smaller than those of Chandra et al. (forthcoming) and more in line with those of 
Contoyannis et al. (2005). Finally, essential drugs that surely prevent deterioration of health and 
prolong life have, as expected, much lower associated average price sensitivity than the 
complementary set of drugs. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents details of the Danish 
market for outpatient prescription drugs and subsidy policies. Section 3 presents the conceptual 
framework including a stylised economic model of drug purchase and links the model to parameters 
of interest and identification strategy. Section 4 outlines the features of the available data. Section 5 
gives the results from the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Danish Market for Outpatient Prescription Drugs 
 
The Danish market for outpatient prescription drugs is highly regulated to secure correct handling 
of as well as uniform prices on drugs across pharmacies. Pharmaceutical companies report 
pharmacy purchase prices to the Danish Medicines Agency, who then announces retail prices. 
These retail prices (along with a comprehensive list of information about the specific drugs 
including substitutable drugs
3) are made publicly available and registered online five years back in 
time. Furthermore, changes in purchase prices must be reported by the pharmaceutical companies 
two weeks ahead of time. Pharmacies must sell the cheapest substitute to prescription drugs unless 
                                                 
3 Substitutes are defined by having the same dose of the active substance as well as the same use (tablets, capsules etc).   6
the prescribing doctor requires otherwise, or the patient specifically asks for another synonymous 
drug.
4 Doctors do not have monetary incentives to prescribe more or less expensive drugs. 
 
Just as in the rest of OECD, consumption of prescription drugs has increased in a Danish context. 
Figure 1 shows average level of consumption in Danish Crowns (DKK)
5 in the period from 1995 – 
2003 (in 1995 prices). On average, a Dane spent roughly DKK 1,750 on prescription drugs in 2003 
while the median was around DKK 400. In comparison, the average patient in treatment for 
diabetes spent about DKK 4,400 on insulin and analogous products alone, the average patient in 
treatment for excess gastric acid production spent about DKK 1,300 on relevant products, while 




AVERAGE CONSUMPTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS OVER TIME (DKK IN 1995) 
 
 
                                                 
4 Before 1997, the physician was required to write on the prescription if substitution was allowed. 
5 € 100 corresponds to DKK 745 as of March 18 2009. 
6 Insulin and analogous products identified by ATC code A10A, treatments for excess gastric acid production ATC 
code A02A, penicillin ATC code J01C. See the Danish Medicines Agency for aggregate statistics, 
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The subsidy scheme for adults 2000 - 2003 
 
Subsidies were (and still are) based on the price of the products. Until June 25 2001, subsidies were 
based on the average price of the two cheapest substitutes. This was designated the reference price. 
After June 25 2001, this was replaced by a system where subsidies were based on the cheapest 
product among substitutes. This was called the subsidy price. However, if one or more of the 
substitutable products were sold within EU, the subsidy price would not be based on the Danish 
price but on the average price within EU.
7 Finally, products subject to parallel import received the 
same subsidy as the original product sold in Denmark.   
 
Starting in March 2000, individual level purchases of subsidised products (see section below for a 
description) were entered into a central register, which all pharmacies draw their information from, 
and total costs were accumulated from the time of first purchase.
8 Accumulated total costs (from 
now on TC) are measured in reference/subsidy prices. Current TC is printed on receipts from drug 
purchases and thus always available to a potential customer. Furthermore, the Danish Medicines 
Agency provides a web page, www.medicinpriser.dk, where individuals can enter relevant 
information and check the price they face for a potential product before going to the pharmacy. A 
call to the pharmacy will yield the same information for those not connected to the internet. 
 
TABLE 1 
THE SUBSIDY SCHEME 2000 – 2003 
 
 
Table 1 describes the subsidy scheme. If an individual has a TC below a given threshold prior to 
purchasing and the price of buying a product brings TC above the threshold, the consumer will 
                                                 
7 Prices in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Luxemburg were excluded because income levels in these countries differed 
substantially from that of Denmark. 
8 Before March 2000, co-insurance rates were fixed at either 50 or 75 % depending on the type of product. An exception 
was Insulin to treat diabetes, which was free of costs. See Skipper (2009) for an analysis of the introduction of the new 
subsidy scheme. 
Mar.-Dec. 2000 2001 2002 2003
DKK DKK DKK DKK
0 % of TC 0 - 500 0 - 510 0 - 515 0 - 540
50 % of TC 500 - 1,200 510 - 1,230 515 - 1,240 540 - 1,300
75 % of TC 1,200 - 2,800 1,230 - 2,875 1,240 - 2,900 1,300 - 3,040
85 % of TC 2,800 + 2,875 + 2,900 + 3,040 +  8
receive the lower subsidy for the part of the price below the threshold and the higher subsidy for the 
part of the price above the threshold. To give an example, consider an individual who considers 
buying a product worth DKK 100. Assume that she has a TC of DKK 400 prior to the purchasing 
decision. In this case, she is not subject to any subsidy should she decide to buy and she will face 
the full price of DKK 100. Assume then instead that her TC prior to purchasing is DKK 450. Now 
she will receive no subsidy for DKK 50 and a 50 % subsidy for the DKK 50 that brings her TC 
account above the threshold point. In this alternative scenario, the price faced by the individual is 
DKK 75. 
 
A year after the first purchase of prescription drugs, TC is re-zeroed. The structure of the subsidies 
forms the basis for identifying the effect of prices on demand for prescription drugs as described in 
the following section. 
 
Retail prices of most prescription drugs are subsidised by the government, leading to a general 
subsidy, though some are only subsidised if the individual has a specific diagnosis or is officially 
retired. This is called a conditional subsidy.  
 
Apart from general and conditional subsidies, an individual can receive one-product, increased, 
chronic’s, terminal, and municipality specific subsidies. In our data, we can identify the type of 
subsidy individuals receive. One-product subsidies concern a specific type of product (and all its 
substitutes) that is subject to neither a general nor a conditional subsidy. A general practitioner 
makes the application on behalf of the patient and the Danish Medicines Agency is decisive. If the 
subsidy is granted, all purchases of the given product will be added to TC in the same manner as 
purchases of products with general or conditional subsidies. Typically, the subsidy will be granted 
for life but may in certain cases be shorter (for example if the product is not to be consumed over an 
extended period).  
 
As pointed out above, general and conditional subsidies are based on the subsidy price. In very rare 
cases, individuals are granted an increased subsidy based on a more expensive product. This only 
occurs if the patient is allergic to a cheaper alternative or suffers from serious side-effects. The 
application procedure is the same as for one-product subsidies and, if granted, purchases are added 
to TC. Again, the subsidy is typically granted for life.   9
Chronically ill individuals with a predicted yearly TC  above a certain threshold (around DKK 
18,000 in the 2000-2003 period) may receive full compensation for any purchases above this value. 
The application procedure is the same as above but subsidies are only for a five-year period. In 
2001 and 2002, 9,084 and 8,141 people out of a population of about 5.5 million people received 
chronic’s subsidies. Terminally ill patients, who choose to spend the remains of their life at home 
instead of being hospitalised do not pay for any drug purchases (inpatient prescription drug 
consumption is free of charge as well). In 2001, 8,430 people received terminal subsidies, and in 
2002 the number was 8,568.  Finally, municipalities may choose to provide further subsidies. These 
are typically granted to low-wealth, low-income retirees. 
 
As in most countries, there exists a private health insurance market as well. The most important 
player in the market for prescription drugs is the company, ”Danmark”. “Danmark” insures about 2 
million Danes. Crucial for our study is that none of the policies of “Danmark” change at the kink 
points described above. In fact, none of “Danmark’s” policies change with yearly consumption of 
prescription drugs. Furthermore, it is not possible to enroll if one has purchased any prescription 
drugs during the last 12 months.
9 The company offers four types of policies; Group 1, 2, 5, and 
Basis. Group 1 and 2 insurance (about 400,000 individuals in total) covers all prescription drug 
expenditures related to products granted one of the government subsidies described above and 50% 
of all costs related to products without any government subsidy and Group 5 insurance (1.3 million 
individuals) that covers 50% of expenditures towards products receiving any government subsidy 
and 25% of costs related to products without any subsidy. Basis insurance does not cover any costs 
of drug purchase but individuals buying this type of insurance may – no matter their health status – 
opt into any of the other insurance policies at any point in time. Group 1 insurance has a yearly cost 
of about DKK 2,400 (in 2007), Group 2 insurance costs DKK 3,200, Group 5 insurance about DKK 
1,000, and Basis about DKK 400. When we discuss our identification strategy below, we will also 
explicitly address the implications of this private option. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
In order to emphasize the identifying assumptions behind our estimation strategy and to provide a 
framework for interpreting our empirical results, this section firstly presents a stylised economic 
                                                 
9 Individuals aged 61 or above cannot enrol either.   10
model of drug purchase. The model is set within the regime described in Section 3 above, where the 
crucial feature is that prescription drug subsidies vary with total consumption. We next discuss 
parameters of interest and identification.   
 
At each point in time, an individual experiences a risk of becoming ill and an associated need to buy 
a given prescription drug. This risk is specific to the individual and may vary with characteristics, 
observable as well as unobservable, and behavior. Therefore, at each point in time, the individual 
must decide whether or not to purchase the drug. Since prescription drug purchase, by definition, 
requires a prescription from a general practitioner, only individuals who experience medically 
substantiated needs are able to do so. Individuals can decide to buy the drug in the amount 
prescribed by the general practitioner or not; he cannot decide on a different amount or an entirely 
different product. Because drug purchase is costly to the individual both in terms of foregone 
consumption and time, not all individuals may choose to buy the drug, although it is expected to 
alleviate pain and/or cure the disease (primary noncompliance) or individuals may take smaller 
amounts than what is prescribed (secondary noncompliance), for example by taking what is known 
as ‘drug-holidays’. 
 
Let DP indicate drug purchase. Assume that the payoff to buying the drug in question over and 
above the payoff of not doing so is U
DP. An individual will then purchase the drug if and only if 
 
     0  
  
Furthermore, assume that the excess payoff is strictly decreasing in the price of the drug, P, (that is, 
in foregone consumption). Then 
 
         1 
  
 0  
 
and, all other things being equal, individuals who receive a lower subsidy will be less likely to 
purchase the drug. 
 
Price sensitivity may obviously vary with the product under consideration. It is likely that demand 
for drugs prescribed for serious illnesses is less price sensitive than average demand. Also, the   11
nature of the symptoms associated with a disease may affect price sensitivity of demand. Moreover, 
whether a condition is chronic or unexpected and temporary may affect demand. In fact, we expect 
forward looking individuals with chronic conditions to react on the average  rather than the 
marginal price, see Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps (1977), whereas individuals affected by an 
unexpected and temporary condition are more likely to react on the marginal price; in our setting, a 
forward looking individual with a chronic condition knows that he will need treatment for a long 
period and that buying today will lower the price of the product tomorrow. The same is not true (at 
least not to the same degree) for somebody who only expects to consume a small amount in the 
future. Finally, individuals with different socio-economic characteristics may react differently. We 
investigate some of these issues in our empirical analyses below. 
 
  
3.1 Parameters of Interest and Identification Strategy 
 
In principle, we are interested in uncovering the entire demand curve for a given prescription drug. 
In other words, how does the propensity to buy a given product change with the price? 
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow for that without strict parametric assumptions. We 
can, however, non-parametrically uncover parts of the demand curve by exploiting the structure of 
the subsidies described above.  
 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the subsidy scheme introduces exogenous variation 
in the price of a given product. Formally, denote the price without any subsidyP . Clearly, given the 
subsidy scheme described above the price P faced by the consumer in a neighborhood of the first 




(1)                         
                    
                                                   
                        
, 
 
where TC is measured prior to the purchasing decision.  
   12
For a graphical representation, consider Figure 2. Here we depict the price faced by the consumer 
for different values of TC starting below the first threshold value TCA.
10 For low values of TC the 
price is constant but as soon as buying the product will push TC above TCA, the price decreases 






When the price is constant we obviously cannot hope to uncover any estimate of price sensitivity. 
Similarly, when the price changes one-to-one with TC, we cannot distinguish the effect of higher 
TC (and likely worse health) from the effect of lower price. What we can exploit, on the other hand, 
is the shift in the slope of the P-TC curve at TCA, a so-called sharp regression kink design.
11 It is 
similar to a regression discontinuity design except that instead of exploiting a shift in levels, we 
exploit a shift in slope. In such a setting, TC is called a forcing variable. In the following we will 
describe the assumptions and mechanics behind the strategy. 
 
                                                 
10 Threshold values B, C, and D give rise to similar variation in the price and the identification strategy is analogous. 
11 We cannot exploit the shift in slopes furthest to the left because we are considering a range of products with different 









Card, Lee and Pei (2009) formally outline the identifying assumptions behind the regression kink 
design. We adopt their notation. Let first W be a set of (predetermined) unobserved random 
variables with distribution function      and let the distribution and density of TC conditional on 
W be given by    |    |   and    |     |  , respectively. Finally, let the price P  be a 
deterministic function of TC,             ; let the purchase propensity be a function of price, total 
costs and unobserved random variables,          1       ,  ,  ;  and let predetermined 
observed variables           .
12 X is determined before TC, which again is determined before P. 
 
Assume the following: 
(Regularity)           1           are real-valued function with continuous first derivatives.  
 
(First stage)          is a known function that is everywhere continuous and is continuously 
differentiable on   ∞,             ,∞  but lim               lim             . In addition, 
   |     |     0           where         0 .     
 
(Smooth density)    |    |   is twice continuously differentiable in tc at TCA for every w. That is, 
    |    |  
     is continuous in tc for all w. 
 
Card, Lee and Pei (2009) show that these assumptions together imply that: 
 
(a)        |           is continuously differentiable in tc at TCA for all w. 
(b) 
         
           |       
              
           |       
   
         
      
              
      
   
   
         
    |          
(c)         |         is continuously differentiable in tc at TCA for all x0. 
 
Intuitively, with the above assumptions we can estimate our parameter of interest 
 
(2)   
         
   |          
         
           |       
              
           |       
   
         
      
              
      
   
 
                                                 
12 Card, Lee and Pei (2009) note that X could in principle enter   ·  directly. Leaving it out is without loss of 
generality.   14
 
by comparing the slope of the propensity to consume with regards to TC for observations that are 
just to the right of TCA with that of observations that are just to the left while properly correcting for 
the deterministic shift in the relationship between P and TC. From this parameter, we can calculate 
implied elasticities as well as predicted changes in amounts caused by changes in the price. 
Specifically, let N be the number of potential buyers and               1   be the quantity sold. 
Clearly, then the percentage change in the propensity to buy caused by a percentage change in the 
price just equals the classic price elasticity: 
 
  
         1 
  
 
        1 
 
         1  
  
 









To give an example of our identification strategy, assume for simplicity that the propensity to 
purchase a given prescription drug does not depend on health and thus in the absence of the subsidy 
scheme would not correlate with TC
13 but decreases linearly in the price of the product. In this case 
the price variation from Figure 2 will translate into a propensity to purchase the product given in 
Figure 3, where we see that the subsidy scheme introduces an exogenous change in the slope of the 













                                                 
13 In reality, the propensity to purchase description drugs may be correlated with TC. Individuals who are more often ill, 





Discussion of the identifying assumptions and their implications 
 
Apart from a set of regularity conditions, we rely on a shift in the P-TC curve at TCA along with the 
assumption of smoothness of the first derivative of the density of TC conditional on W. As pointed 
out by Card, Lee and Pei (2009), this latter assumption is the critical one and implies that agents 
must not have full control of the forcing variable, TC. The discontinuous shift in the slope of the 
relationship between P and TC arises immediately from the subsidy scheme as described above.  
 
An important implication of the identifying assumptions is (c) above, which says that any 
predetermined variable X should have a cumulative distribution function that is differentiable with 
respect to TC. In other words, there must be no kink in the distribution of X. Card, Lee and Pei 
(2009) stress that it is not enough to show that means of covariates are similar on both sides of the 
kink point. Here, we need to consider the empirical distribution of X given TC. Of course, this is 
trivially satisfied if the distribution of X does not vary with TC in a neighborhood around the kink 
point. This would be true, for example, if individuals do not experience a shift in health status or the 
propensity to take up private health insurance when their total costs increase slightly.  
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TCA   16
A second issue regarding identification concerns endogenous (or strategic) sorting with regards to 
TC. In the tax literature, individuals sometimes bunch at tax kink points, see Chetty et al. (2009) 
and Saez (2008). In that setting, bunching is optimal because higher income increases the marginal 
tax rate. Therefore it might be optimal to refrain from supplying an extra hour of work. We do not 
worry about bunching, however, since it is suboptimal in our setting. Here, a higher level of 
consumption weakly reduces the price faced by the consumer. We do, nonetheless, show the 
distribution of observations around the kink point; see below. 
  
 
Interpretation of parameter of interest 
 
The parameter we uncover is clearly local. In fact, Card, Lee and Pei (2009) demonstrate that the 
parameter uncovered by the regression kink design corresponds to both the ‘treatment on the 
treated’ parameter of Florens, Heckman, Meghir and Vytlacil (2008) as well as the ‘local average 
response’ of Altonji and Matzkin (2005).  It can be interpreted as the expected price sensitivity 
around TCA for individuals who buy drugs worth at least TCA or about DKK 500 (circa € 70) in 
2000 in a given 12-month period. Of course, this does not address the price sensitivity for 
individuals who rarely (or never) buy prescription drugs. Similarly, the degree of price 
responsiveness for the same individual may vary depending on the level of past consumption (i.e. 
health status). Thus, even if all individuals who buy drugs worth a total of DKK 500 actually end up 
buying drugs worth DKK TCB or about DKK 1,200 (circa € 160) in 2000 in the same given 12-
month period, the estimated price sensitivity at TCA may differ from that at TCB.  
 
A second issue is that we estimate price sensitivity in the presence of private health insurance. As 
mentioned above, we do assume that individuals do not experience a shift in the propensity to take 
up private health insurance when their total costs increase slightly. Still, private health insurance 
matters for the interpretation of our results. Mechanically, because “Danmark” pays a fixed share of 
the costs to the patient, what the existence of private health insurance does is to shift the 
relationship between P and TC; it effectively diminishes the extent to which P is reduced when TC 
increases. In the extreme case where everybody subscribed to private health insurance and all costs 
of prescriptions drugs were covered by this insurance, demand would not be sensitive to the price at 
all. More generally, private health insurance reduces observed price sensitivity compared to a   17
regime with no private alternative. The same holds for the additional government subsidies 





Though our parameter of interest is non-parametrically identified, for efficiency reasons we impose 
local parametric assumptions. We consider a small neighborhood around the threshold value and 
estimate the propensity to purchase using a simple probit model, where our unit of observation is 
whether a consumer buys prescription drugs during a given week.
14 To demonstrate, consider the 
following simple model where TC enters linearly in the index: 
 
(3)                           1|                        1                1           ·     , 
 
where TC is again the total cost variable, 1            indicates whether a purchase was done just 
above a given kink-point j, and 1           ·     is the interaction of total cost and the kink-
dummy. From the interaction term between the kink-dummy and TC in (2), we can calculate the 
(estimated) difference in the propensity to purchase caused by TC crossing threshold value j.
15 In 
practice, we investigate whether higher order terms of TC should be included.  
 
In particular, take the derivative of the above expression with respect to TC to get 
 
         1|1          ,   
   
            1              ·  
  
Since 1            is dichotomous, we simply evaluate the above derivative for 1            1  
and 1            0 , and then take their difference:  
 
                                                 
14 Whether we use a probit or a linear probability model does not change the conclusions from the analyses below. 
15 The model is estimated under the restriction that there is no jump at the kink points yet the results are not sensitive to 
this.    18
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         1|1           0 ,     
   
            1              ·        ·  
            
This is our estimate of the numerator in (2). The denominator is the difference between 
  
    on each 
side of the kink. This is immediately available from the price scheme presented above and clearly 
depends on the kink in question.  
 
A couple of practical problems arise within this framework: Firstly, our identification strategy 
formally holds in a small neighborhood around the threshold points. In practice, we need to choose 
a bandwidth. The problem with comparing observations that are far away from the threshold values 
is, of course, that others factors beyond the difference in drug subsidy may drive the decision of 
drug purchase. Individuals with lower TC are, for example, less likely to be ill in the first place. For 
precisely this reason we need observations close to a given value of TC. On the other hand, we need 
a large number of observations. In general, a regression discontinuity design requires a large 
number of observations; see for example Lee and Lemieux (2009). Intuitively, a regression kink 
design is even more data demanding because we have to estimate not a shift in levels but a shift in 
the slope.  
 
Secondly, if the price of the product under consideration (or equivalently TC) is ‘too low’ relative to 
the bandwidth for individuals on the left hand side of the kink, we run the risk that the price does 
not depend on TC at all; we are on the leftmost flat part of the graph in Figure 1, see also (1) above. 
If this is the case, we will not get a consistent estimate of our parameter of interest. In fact, if the 
propensity to purchase is increasing in TC, we will likely underestimate price sensitivity. In the 
example in Figure 3 above, where we for expositional purposes assume that the propensity to 
consume does not vary with underlying health, our estimate of the price sensitivity will be zero if 
we use observations on the leftmost flat part as controls, whereas it is in fact negative. Conversely, 
if the price is ‘too high’ we run the risk that individuals cross the next kink point and receive an 
even larger subsidy for part of the price.  
 
In the empirical analyses below we investigate how sensitive our estimates are to the choice of 
bandwidth. We also investigate the distribution of prices of prescription drugs. If only a small share   19
of prices are lower than our bandwidth, the problem that we may partly identify of a part of the TC 
curve where the price does not depend on TC is of little importance. In the same way, if only a 
small share of prices are higher than the difference between the threshold points, the problem that 
individuals may cross the next threshold point is minor as well. If we, for example, consider the 50 
% threshold point, prices should be below DKK 700 in 2000 to avoid this problem. Finally, we 
investigate results for products where the price is sufficiently large (larger than half the bandwidth) 
but also sufficiently small (smaller than the difference between two neighboring kink points). 
 
Note that the fact that we need to estimate a shift in the slope of the propensity to purchase curve 
precludes the use of falsification tests where a ‘fake’ kink is investigated. Since the functional form 
of the curve is unknown and potentially differs between real and fake kink points, we cannot use the 
functional form specification from the actual kink points to investigate any fake kink points. Thus, 
we cannot identify whether a significant shift in the slope of the curve at a random fake kink point 
is just caused by misspecification.  
 
Finally, in practice we can only meaningfully investigate price responsiveness in a neighborhood 
around the lowest kink point TCA (and to some extent around TCB). This reflects both the paucity of 
the data at higher kink points as well as smaller changes in subsidies. 
 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section first describes the available data and discusses how we construct the dependent 
variable as well as the forcing variable. We then present a range of descriptive statistics. 
  
We use administrative data provided by Statistics Denmark. The data set contains information on a 
representative sample of 20% of all Danish individuals in the period from 2000-2003. For each 
individual in the sample in this period we know the complete history of prescription drug purchases 
including date, price, amount of subsidy, type of subsidy, and type of drug. These data are 
augmented with socio-economic information describing demographics, income, and education on a 
yearly basis. Unfortunately, we do not know diagnoses, nor do we have information on unredeemed 
prescription notes. Thus from the perspective of the econometrician, there are no differences   20
between a decision not to buy after having seen a doctor and having him prescribe a product and the 
decision not to go to a doctor in the first place. Finally, we do not know whether an individual has 
private insurance. All estimates of price sensitivity are therefore estimated for potentially forward 
looking agents within a market where private health insurance – that may cover part of or all costs 
related to prescription drugs – exists. As argued above, these are also the policy relevant estimates. 
 
In the following, we discard observations for individuals who, at the time of purchase, were below 
18 years. Most importantly, the subsidy scheme described above is only valid for adults. 
Additionally, young individuals are perhaps more likely to have someone else pay for their 
prescription drugs. Thus we would not measure their price sensitivity. 
 
Table 2 first shows our variables related to prescription drug purchases. The Anatomical 
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) variable is a five level code for classification of drugs, which it is 
defined and maintained by WHO; see Table 3 for an example that explains the components of the 
ATC-code.
16,17 DDD measures the number of daily doses included on the prescription (given that 
the drug is used for its primary purpose). TOS  is the type of subsidy associated with the 
prescription, see Section 2. SUB is the amount of subsidy received, while SP is the subsidy price 
mentioned in Section 2. NAME is the brand or the name of the company that produced the drug. The 











                                                 
16 Some prescription drugs are not assigned an ATC-code. This group often consists of so-called magistral medicinal 
products, which are drugs produced at the pharmacy. In general, these products do not qualify for subsidy. 
17 See also Appendix A, Table A1 for a list of the twenty most common (in terms of number of purchases) therapeutic 
subgroups and Table A2 for the twenty largest therapeutic groups in terms of expenditure shares. Table A3 shows the 
twenty most commonly sold products.   21
TABLE 2 




EXAMPLE OF ATC-CODE 
 
 
Table 4 next presents the list of variables describing socio-economic characteristics. All variables 
are measured in the year prior to the purchasing decision. UEMP specifies the fraction of working-
hours in a given year spent unemployed. INC is before-tax income of the individual and LINC is 
before-tax labor income. We use these variables to investigate price sensitivity for different 









NP Number of packages purchased
ATC Active ingredient
DDD Defined daily doses on prescription
TOS Type of subsidy
SUB Amount of subsidy received
SP Reference/subsidy price
NAME Brand level name of drug
EDP Exact date of purchase
TP Total price of drug
OP Out-of-pocket payment for drug
ATC-code A10BA02
A Alimentary tract and metabolism
(1st level, main anatomical group)
A10 Drugs used to treat diabetes
(2nd level, therapeutic subgroup)
A10B Oral blood glucose lowering drugs
(3rd level, pharmacological subgroup)
A10BA Biguanides
(4th level, chemical subgroup)
A10BA02 Metformin
(5th level, chemical substance)  22
TABLE 4 
VARIABLES IN THE DATA SET 
 
 
The dependent variable 
 
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable for prescription drug purchase in a given week. It takes 
the value one if an individual purchases prescription drugs and is zero otherwise. We can think of 
three potential groups of individuals: ‘Always-takers’ who buy a product regardless of the price, 
‘never-takers’ who never buy a product and ‘compliers’ who buy a product if it is sufficiently 
cheap, see Imbens and Angrist (1994). Since we do not know whether a prescription has been filled, 
never-takers will likely constitute a sizeable fraction of the zeroes. On the other hand, some 
individuals may not even go to the doctor in the first place because of price sensitivity. Remember 
though, that all the individuals we are exploiting for identification purposes have, by definition, at 
some point during the last 12 months been to the doctor to pick up a prescription and made a 
purchase. The fact that we do not observe degree of need is shared with the entire literature. It is, 
however, innocuous in the sense that neither never-takers nor always-takers contribute to 
identification of the change in the propensity to buy caused by a change in the price. All the 
inclusion of these two groups does is to cause a parallel (downwards or upwards) shift in the 
propensity to purchase drugs around the kink point. As such, they do not affect the slope of the 
relationship between P and TC and have therefore no impact on the identification of the percentage 
in the propensity to buy at a change in the price either. What will be affected, however, is the 
estimate of the percentage change in the propensity to purchase at a percentage change in the price; 
the associated implied elasticity ε. The reason is that this parameter is evaluated at the average 
propensity to purchase; see the definition of the elasticity on page 14 above. As such, one can think 





NCHILD Number of children below the age of 18
UNEMP Fraction of time spent unemployed
INC Yearly income
EDUC Highest completed education
GEN Gender
LINC Yearly labor income  23
We consider all weeks in a year so any seasonal differences in the propensity to purchase are 
averaged out. Note that this means that individuals may appear more than once. We account for this 
by clustering the standard errors at the individual level.
18 For the purpose of constructing 
elasticities, we consider the first purchase in a given week. This is done to avoid modeling the 
decision to buy a basket of products at the same time. It is unproblematic as long as it is random 
which product the pharmacist enters into the cash register as the first.  
 
Constructing accumulated total costs, TC 
 
We next need to construct the forcing variable, TC. As described in Section 2, TC is the sum of the 
subsidy price associated with each purchase over the individual’s subsidy year. We have 
information on the date of purchase in the data as well as the subsidy price, so constructing TC 
amounts to accumulating the subsidy price for each individual for all purchases starting from March 
1 2000. 365 days after the first purchase TC is re-zeroed. The next TC year starts with the first 
purchase after the re-zeroing.  
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
As pointed out above, our identifying assumptions imply that any predetermined variable X should 
have a cumulative distribution function that is differentiable with respect to TC. I.e. there must be 
no kink in the distribution of X. Figures 4-8 show the distribution of our predetermined covariates 
around the 50 % subsidy kink. We consider number of children, labor income, unemployment, total 
income, age and education. Education is a dummy for more than 12 years of schooling. Income is 
measured in DKK and is discounted to year 2000. Again, all variables are measured in the year 





                                                 
18 The results are not sensitive to clustering. Unfortunately, we are not able to incorporate individual level fixed effects 
because only a very small fraction of individuals are observed to have a TC within the bandwidth but on each side of a 
given kink point.   24
FIGURE 4
a 
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF CHILDREN AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
 





DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR INCOME AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
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FIGURE 6
a 
DISTRIBUTION OF DEGREE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
 




DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
 































DISTRIBUTION OF AGE AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
 




DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
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For completeness and to illustrate the role of covariates in our estimations, Tables 5 and 6 show 
differences in means for individuals in 2000 with a TC in the intervals between DKK 450-550 and 
DKK 475-525. Results for other years and kinks are similar and available on request. We see that 
some of the differences in means are statistically significant at the 5 % level when considering the 
DKK 450-550 interval in Table 5. Since our sample is very large (about 100,000 yearly 
observations in the 450-550 interval), this is expected. The differences themselves are very small.
19 









Figure 10 shows the distribution of observations around the 50% subsidy kink. The dots show the 
average number of observations in DKK 1 intervals. As expected, there are no signs of bunching on 
either side of the kink. 
  
 
                                                 
19 The sign also varies from year to year. 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N t-statistic
NCHILD                0.34               0.78    50,270  0.32              0.77              45,753         1.7
LINC 100,108.57     145,713.70  50,270  95,682.88     144,606.24  45,753         3.3
UEMP 30.08              125.14          50,270  30.42            127.13          45,753         -0.3
INC 185,754.94     183,015.61  50,270  183,172.47  151,168.10  45,753         1.7
AGE 56.82              18.03            50,270  57.17            18.10            45,753         -2.1
EDUC 0.55                0.50              50,270  0.56              0.50              45,753         -1.8
DESCRIPTIVE STATIS TICS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, YEAR 2000
450<TC<500 500<TC<550
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N t-statistic
NCHILD                0.33               0.78    26,036  0.31              0.75              23,727         1.6
LINC 98,637.91       146,150.81  26,036  96,013.36     141,905.25  23,727         1.4
UEMP 28.91              122.50          26,036  29.70            125.62          23,727         -0.5
INC 185,576.73     202,204.73  26,036  183,478.06  152,314.16  23,727         0.9
AGE 57.05              17.99            26,036  57.11            17.99            23,727         -0.3
EDUC 0.52                0.50              64,013  0.53              0.50              58,940         -1.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATIS TICS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, YEAR 2000
475<TC<500 500<TC<525  28
FIGURE 10
a 
DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS AROUND 50% SUBSIDY KINK 
 
 
a The average number of observations is calculated within bins of DKK 1.  
 
As pointed out above, it is potentially important that our bandwidth is sufficiently small compared 
to the minimum price of prescription drugs and that the prices are not too high. Otherwise we run 
the risk of a downwards bias in our estimates. For this reason we investigate the distribution of 
prices. 
 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the reference/subsidy price (see Section 2 above for further 
details) for sales for individuals with TC in the DKK 450-550 interval. The subsidy price is the 
price that determines the size of the subsidy. Only a small share of the prices is smaller than DKK 
50 and the share below DKK 10 is minuscule. This is even clearer in Figure 6 where we investigate 
the distribution for subsidy prices below DKK 100. Figure 5 additionally shows that only a small 
share of the purchases is associated with a very high price. This means that the concerns regarding 
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DISTRIBUTION OF REFERENCE/SUBSIDY PRICES FOR PURCHASES, TC IN DKK 450-550 INTERVAL 
SUBSIDY PRICE BELOW DKK 100 
   30
5. Results 
 
This section presents our estimation results. As described above we model the decision to purchase 
prescription drugs in a given week using the probit specification outlined in Section 3 but add year 
dummies as well. Our main analyses consider the kink caused by the lowest subsidy (50 %). TC is 
discounted to year 2000 using the consumer price index. To secure that we correctly capture the 
functional form of the curve, we start out by including higher order terms of TC and test the model 
down. In practice, all models include TC in levels while higher order terms are insignificant.  
 
Figure 13 shows the empirical relationship between the propensity to buy and TC around the lowest 
kink point.
20 The solid line shows the predicted values from OLS estimation of the model in Section 
3, while the dots show the average purchase propensity in DKK 1 intervals. Important for our 
strategy, the figure indicates that there is a shift in the slope of the purchase propensity around the 





a The average purchase propensity is calculated within bins of DKK 1. The solid line shows predicted values from OLS estimation of the model in 
section 3. 
                                                 
20 It is the empirical equivalent to the simple model example shown in Figure 3. 



























Table 8 presents the results from the formal analyses for this lower kink point.
21 As mentioned 
above, all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The upper part of the table shows the 
results using the full set of products. The estimates are small and negative and in line with those 
from the existing literature. The size of the estimates does vary somewhat with the bandwidth: the 
estimate using a bandwidth of DKK 50 yields an elasticity of -0.08; a ten percent increase in the 
price decreases the propensity to buy with 0.8 per cent. This estimate is significant at the 10 % 
level, while the estimated elasticity using a DKK 25 bandwidth is larger in size (-0.25) and 
significant at the 5 % level. The middle part of the table shows results when including covariates in 
the analyses. We condition on the variables shown in Tables 5 and 6 above: Number of children, 
labor income, degree of unemployment throughout the year, income, age, and an indicator for more 
than 12 years of education. The size of the estimated elasticity using a DKK 25 bandwidth is 
reduced from -0.25 to -0.18 by this exercise yet the two estimates are not significantly different 
from each other. The result using a DKK 50 bandwidth is unchanged by the inclusion of covariates.  
 
The estimates might, however, have been contaminated by purchase decisions where the price is 
lower than the bandwidth. Similarly, if the price is ‘too high’ we run the risk that individuals cross 
the next kink point and receive an even larger subsidy for part of the price. The lower part of Table 
8 shows the results where we exclude purchases where the associated price is either too low or too 
high in this respect. We do not find evidence that the inclusion of ‘too low’ or ‘too high’ prices 
biases our estimates.  
 
                                                 




5.1 Sensitivity analysis 
 
As discussed above, it is unlikely that all individuals react similarly to price variation. This 
subsection investigates whether the estimated parameters for the 50 % subsidy threshold vary across 
subpopulations and investigates price sensitivity at the 75 % threshold. Table 9 shows the results 
where we only include individuals who exclusively receive general subsidies. That is, we exclude 
individuals who receive any additional subsidies as outlined in Section 2. This exercise reduces 
sample sizes with around 50 %. Significance is, not surprisingly, affected by this but the estimates 
are similar to those using the full set of products. Thus there is no evidence that individuals who 
receive additional subsidies are more or less sensitive to the price of prescription drugs compared to 
individuals who receive further subsidies. 
 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.11 0.06 -0.08 87.96 90.28 368,497/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.34 0.17 -0.25 85.47 90.37 184,220/1,558,687 171,564  
Include covariates
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.10 0.06 -0.07 87.96 90.28 368,497/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.23 0.16 -0.17 85.47 90.37 184,220/1,558,687 171,564  
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.10 0.05 -0.09 89.18 70.61 310,779/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.32 0.14 -0.22 79.16 68.87 175,818/1,558,687 171,564  
10 DKK -0.23 0.62 -0.15 75.74 68.54 71,062/613,707 81,562    
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500
TABLE 8




Secondly, we consider differences in price sensitivity by level of education and income in Tables 10 
and 11 and the results are striking. We distinguish between high and low level of education (12 
years or less education versus more than 12 years of education) and high and low income (less than 
average income versus more than average income). Demand for prescription drugs for individuals 
with lower levels of education is more responsive to the price than demand for individuals with 
higher levels of education. Note that individuals with lower levels of education also pay a lower 
average price. Similarly, demand for individuals with less than average income is more price 
responsive than demand for individuals with higher than average income. There could be several 
explanations for these patterns; apart from potential differences in preferences for health 
investments, individuals with lower levels of income face tighter budget constraints, they could 
have less information about the importance of taking a particular drug, or they could be treated 
differently by doctors than individuals with higher socio-economic status. See for example 
Simeonova (2008).  
 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.06 0.07 -0.06 96.44 87.56 146,154/1,550,985 135,670  
25 DKK -0.37 0.21 -0.29 93.38 86.59 72,602/612,289 81,926    
Include covariates
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.04 0.03 -0.04 96.44 87.56 146,154/1,550,985 135,670  
25 DKK -0.13 0.10 -0.10 93.38 86.59 72,602/612,289 81,926    
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.05 0.07 -0.06 98.08 66.09 124,564/1,550,985 135,670  
25 DKK -0.32 0.19 -0.31 87.79 65.77 69,172/766,521 81,926    
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, GENERAL SUBSIDY ONLY
TABLE 9
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS, 
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amoun  34
 
 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
<12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.27 0.09 -0.16 79.13 85.21 199,865/1,529,336 136,859    
25 DKK -0.41 0.25 -0.24 76.90 84.84 100,144/758,851 89,783      
>12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.03 0.08 0.03 98.42 94.89 168,632/1,607,662 127,730    
25 DKK -0.24 0.22 -0.22 95.68 95.56 84,076/799,836 82,229      
Include covariates
<12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.10 0.05 -0.06 79.13 85.21 199,865/1,529,336 136,859    
25 DKK -0.06 0.13 -0.03 76.90 84.84 100,144/758,851 89,783      
>12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.01 0.03 -0.01 98.42 94.89 168,632/1,607,662 127,730    
25 DKK -0.16 0.10 -0.14 95.68 95.56 84,076/799,836 82,229      
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
<12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.25 0.08 -0.19 81.18 69.26 167,011/1,529,336 136,859    
25 DKK -0.40 0.21 -0.23 71.65 67.09 95,860/758,851 89,783      
>12 yrs
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.04 0.07 0.04 98.48 71.03 143,768/1,607,662 127,730    
25 DKK -0.21 0.19 -0.19 88.17 69.89 79,958/799,836 82,229      
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 10
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS, 
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY EDUCATION  35
 
 
Table 12 shows the results for three age groups: individuals under the age of 30, individuals aged 
31-64, and individuals aged 65 or above. Young individuals are literally insensitive to the price; the 
estimates are close to zero and insignificant. Older individuals, on the other hand, are more sensitive 
to the price of the product. One explanation for this pattern is simply life expectancy; if one does 
not expect to live much longer, it may not pay off to invest much in health either; see the seminal 
work by Grossman (1972) on health and Becker (1964) on human capital investments more 
generally. Another explanation could be that the elderly population aged 65 or above also has lower 
levels of income though they also have higher accumulated wealth.  
 
 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
Low Income
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.20 0.08 -0.12 80.51 86.26 256,373/1,965,881 179,990  
25 DKK -0.51 0.22 -0.31 78.30 86.33 128,228/976,665 117,090  
High Income
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.01 0.09 0.01 104.96 96.63 111,657/1,165,187 93,180    
25 DKK 0.00 0.24 0.00 101.88 96.85 55,761/579,050 58,218    
Include covariates
Low Income
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.09 0.04 -0.05 80.51 86.26 256,373/1,965,881 179,990  
25 DKK -0.17 0.10 -0.10 78.30 86.33 128,228/976,665 117,090  
High Income
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.01 0.04 0.01 104.96 96.63 111,657/1,165,187 93,180    
25 DKK -0.02 0.12 -0.02 101.88 96.85 55,761/579,050 58,218    
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
Low Income
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.19 0.07 -0.14 82.33 69.27 214,756/1,965,881 155,930  
25 DKK -0.49 0.19 -0.29 72.74 67.07 122,584/976,665 97,704    
High Income
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.04 0.08 0.05 104.49 71.15 95,625/1,165,187 80,631    
25 DKK 0.04 0.21 0.04 93.92 70.63 53,015/579,050 48,895    
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 11
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS, 
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY INCOME  36
 
 
A fourth sensitivity analysis distinguishes between essential and other types of drugs (the 
complement set). Essential drugs are defined as “medications that prevent deterioration in health or 
prolong life and would not likely be prescribed in the absence of a definitive diagnosis”, Tamblyn et 
al. (2001), page 422. See Table B2 in Appendix B for the list of drugs included in the essential 
category. As expected, demand for essential drugs is less price responsive than demand for other 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
< 30 years
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.00 0.14 0.00 92.08 89.13 26,837/353,920 26,698    
25 DKK -0.02 0.39 -0.03 89.89 89.77 13,422/176,284 16,315    
30-64 years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.07 0.07 -0.07 95.19 93.17 206,323/1,945,490 155,256  
25 DKK -0.34 0.20 -0.29 92.47 93.70 103,069/966,466 100,072  
65+ years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.27 0.12 -0.13 76.12 84.63 135,337/837,588 86,484    
25 DKK -0.19 0.34 -0.09 73.95 83.94 67,729/415,937 57,134    
Include covariates
< 30 years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.01 0.07 -0.01 92.08 89.13 26,837/353,920 26,698    
25 DKK 0.00 0.20 0.00 89.89 89.77 13,422/176,284 16,315    
30-64 years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.03 0.03 -0.03 95.19 93.17 206,323/1,945,490 155,256  
25 DKK -0.17 0.10 -0.15 92.47 93.70 103,069/966,466 100,072  
65+ years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.12 0.06 -0.06 76.12 84.63 135,337/837,588 86,484    
25 DKK -0.05 0.17 -0.02 73.95 83.94 67,729/415,937 57,134    
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
< 30 years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.01 0.13 -0.02 94.70 67.47 22,348/353,920 26,698    
25 DKK 0.07 0.33 0.09 84.27 66.51 12,672/176,284 16,315    
30-64 years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.05 0.06 -0.06 96.37 70.76 174,898/1,945,490 155,256  
25 DKK -0.28 0.17 -0.23 85.97 69.66 98,029/966,466 100,072  
65+ years
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.27 0.11 -0.15 77.02 69.33 113,533/837,588 86,484    
25 DKK -0.29 0.32 -0.12 67.91 66.63 65,117/415,937 57,134    
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 12
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS, 
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
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types of drugs. Note though that the complement set of drugs may also include drugs that in some 





We finally investigate the 75 % subsidy kink. The estimated treatment effects are still negative and 
slightly smaller in size. Only the result for the DKK 50 bandwidth is statistically significant. 
Because of more limited sample sizes (the number of observations is reduced to around 40 % when 
we move from the 50 % subsidy kink to the 75 % subsidy kink) and a lower change in the subsidy 
at the higher kink we refrain from performing subgroup specific analyses. 
  
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
E ssential
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.00 0.03 -0.01 101.55 103.30 107,496/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.12 0.09 -0.35 99.29 103.45 53,541/1,558,687 171,564  
Other
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.12 0.05 -0.29 82.39 83.76 261,308/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.22 0.14 -0.52 79.84 83.83 130,838/1,558,687 171,564  
Include covariates
E ssential
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.00 0.01 0.01 101.55 103.30 107,496/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.04 0.04 -0.11 99.29 103.45 53,541/1,558,687 171,564  
Other
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.06 0.02 -0.14 82.39 83.76 261,308/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.08 0.06 -0.19 79.84 83.83 130,838/1,558,687 171,564  
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
E ssential
(+/-) 50 DKK 0.03 0.03 0.09 100.55 81.54 90,254/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.10 0.08 -0.28 89.30 79.89 50,799/1,558,687 171,564  
Other
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.11 0.04 -0.14 84.53 65.05 220,525/3,136,998 263,393  
25 DKK -0.22 0.12 -0.21 75.04 63.39 125,019/1,558,687 171,564  
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID. Results are not sensitive to clustering.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
TABLE 13
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
50 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 500, BY DRUG TYPE  38
 
 
Our results are not directly comparable to those from the RAND HIE (see Manning et al. (1987) 
and Newhouse (1993)) since that study considered – for the non-aged population – total health care 
utilization and not only prescription drugs. Our results, on the other hand, are local in the sense that 
they are estimated around the 50 % subsidy kink point. Using a similarly aged population our 
results are, nonetheless, fairly close in size to those from the RAND HIE. Our study does suggest 
that the elderly population is more responsive to the price than the non-elderly but the results are 
much more in line with the Canadian study by Contoyannis et al. (2005) who find moderate price 
elasticities (-0.12 to -0.16) than with the US study by Chandra et al. (forthcoming) that finds large 
and in some specifications even elastic demand (elasticities -0.20 to -1.4).
22 An obvious explanation 
for these differences are differences between welfare systems but also the fact that Chandra et al. 
(forthcoming) use data on former public sector employees may impact on the results. As suggested 
by Tamblyn et al. (2001) we find that demand for essential drugs is less sensitive to the price than 





                                                 
22 Chandra et al. (forthcoming) argue that the products with elastic demand are those for which consumers can easily 
substitute into other treatments. 
Treatment effect S.E.  ε Avg. P  Std. P Obs.  People
(*1,000) (*1,000)
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.43 0.20 -0.15 60.76 72.88 218,736/1,289,790 168,086  
25 DKK -0.45 0.56 -0.16 59.76 73.71 109,218/639,732 104,591  
Include covariates
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.11 0.05 -0.04 60.76 72.88 218,736/1,289,790 168,086  
25 DKK -0.15 0.14 -0.05 59.76 73.71 109,218/639,732 104,591  
Exclude if price 'too
low' or 'too high'
(+/-) 50 DKK -0.40 0.19 -0.17 65.03 68.67 195,700/1,289,790 168,086  
25 DKK -0.50 0.56 -0.17 56.66 62.78 105,841/639,732 104,591  
Treatment effecs and implied elasticities at DKK 500 kink. S.E. clustered by Person ID.
Avg. P is average price paid by consumers and obs. gives the number of purchases observed and the total number of  
observations. Italic estimates are significant at the 10 % level, bold estimates are significant at the 5 % level.
that would push the consumer over the next kink (too high price).
TABLE 14
TREATMENT EFFECT AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, ALL PRODUCTS, 
75 % SUBSIDY KINK, TC = DKK 1,200
Exclude if price 'too low' or 'too high' excludes products that cost less than half the bandwith (too low price) or more than the amount  39
6. Conclusion 
 
We estimate price sensitivity of demand for prescription drugs exploiting truly exogenous variation 
in the price that stems from a kinked reimbursement scheme. Within a unifying framework, we are 
able to address this question for different subpopulations and types of drugs. We find that demand is 
indeed sensitive to the price, although estimated implied elasticities are small; the overall elasticity 
ranges between -0.08 and -0.25 for individuals who have, so far, bought prescription drugs worth at 
least DKK 500 (€ 70) in a given 12-month period. There is important variation in which subgroups 
are affected by the price of prescription drugs. Individuals with lower income and lower education 
are, despite (or maybe because of) their lower average health capital, more sensitive to the price of a 
product. The same is true for the elderly population. Thus, policy makers should be aware that 
reductions in subsidies for these groups are likely to result in lower consumption and, presumably, 
worse health outcomes. Along similar lines, lower consumption of prescription drugs may increase 
the take-up of inpatient and outpatient case; see for example Chandra et al. (forthcoming) and 
Gaynor, Li, and Vogt (2006) for evidence of this behavior. Finally, essential drugs that surely 
prevent deterioration of health and keep patients alive have, as expected, much lower associated 
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As can be seen from Table A1, the type of drug most frequently used is psycholeptic drugs 
(antipsychotics). The second most frequently purchased type of drugs belongs to the analgesics 
category (pain relievers). This category covers products for severe pain (e.g. morphine) to over-the-
counter products such as Panodil/Tylenol (mild pain relievers would qualify for conditional 





























THE 20 MOST FREQUENTLY USED THERAPEUTIC GROUPS
Name
Statistics Denmark. Purchases in period March 1st 2000-2003, age 18 and above, 20% sample.
Agents that exert an action on the renin-angiotensin system
Agents that exert an action on acid related disorders
Beta blocking agents
Anti-thrombotic drugs






Cough and cold preparations
Psycholeptics
Analgesics
Sex hormones and modulators of the genital system
Antibacterial agents for systemic use
Corticosteroids for dermatological use
Cardiac therapy
Anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic agents
Diuretics





Table A2 shows therapeutic groups by expenditure shares. Here, obstructive airway disease agents 
(asthma medicine) dominate with psychoanaleptics (anti-depressants and ADHD drugs) and 
analgesics in second and third place. 
 
Finally, Table A3 shows the 20 most frequently sold products. Here, we exploit the full ATC-code 
level. As can be seen, phenoxymethylpenicillin (penicillin) is the single most prescribed drug, 
claiming about 2.5 % of total sales. The second most sold product is paracetamol, which is a pain 
reliever. In third and fourth place are ibuprofen (used for anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic 



































Statistics Denmark. Purchases in period March 1st 2000-2003, age 18 and above, 20% sample.
Antiepileptics
Anti-diabetics
Antibacterial agents for systemic use
Urologicals
Sex hormones and modulators of the genital system
Lipid modifying agents
Calcium channel blockers
Anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic agents
Analgesics
Psycholeptics
Agents that exert an action on the renin-angiotensin system
Agents that exert an action on acid related disorders
THERAPEUTIC GROUPS BY EXPENDITURES
Name
Obstructive airway disease agents




















































Essential drugs: Insulin, anticoagulants, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors,
lipid-reducing medication, antihypertensives, furosemide, B-blockers,
antiarrhythmics, aspirin, antiviral medication, thyroid medication, 
neuroleptics, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, antiparkinsonian drugs,
prednisone, β-agonists, inhaled steroids, chloroquines, primaquines,
and cyclosporine.
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